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Home Rule In Montana-Present and Proposed
By DAVID R. MASON*
One who turns the pages of the Montana cases concerned with munici-
pal corporations and their powers will witness what appears to be a basic,
although often unarticulated, conflict as to the position of cities and towns
in the Montana polity. The extent to which the inhabitants of a local com-
munity may control their own affairs free from legislative interference has
always been a matter of some dispute. There is a theory of an inherent
right to local self-government, which distinguishes "governmental" func-
tions of a municipal corporation as an agent of the state from functions
primarily or principally in the interests of the people living within the
limits of the municipality. Under this theory a municipal corporation en-
joys an absolute right of self-government in those matters which are of mu-
nicipal concern and which can be labeled "local," "private," or "propri-
etary."' It is nurtured by some tenets of a democratic philosophy, and it
is based upon an assumption that a uniform system of local self-govern-
ment was well established as an Anglo-American tradition long before the
American state was created, and that the principles of this system were
transmitted to American municipalities through the common law and in-
corporated into the constitutions of the several states as an implied reser-
vation of power to municipal corporations. As against this home rule
theory, however, there is a more sophisticated legal theory, based upon a
republican philosophy and the principle, or doctrine, that all legislative
powers reserved to the states by the Constitution of the United States are
vested in the state legislatures, except as prohibited by the state constitu-
tion.'
*Professor of Law, Montana State University. Member of the South Dakota Bar
and the Montana Bar. A.B. 1926, LL.B. 1924, University of South Dakota; S.J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1927.
'This theory of local self-government applies only to true municipal corporations
(cities and towns), not to quasi-municipal corporations (counties, school districts,
etc.). The distinction between the two is found in the fact that quasi-municipal
corporations serve only as administrative agents of the state, while true municipal
(orporations also perform functions of local concern. State v. Holmes, 100 Mont.
256, 47 P.2d 624 (1935) : Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 30 (1960) ; Mil-
ligan v. Miles City. 51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 376, L.R.A. 1916C 395 (1915). Cf., how-
ever, Lindeen v. Montana Liquor Control Board, 122 Mont. 549, 207 P.2d 947
(1949).
A distinction between matters of general state interest and matters of local con-
cern is, of course, difficult to apply; in a sense any matter of local concern Is also
a matter of state concern. Resort to labels such as "private" or "proprietary," as
distinct from "governmental," while having a basis in the long-established doctrine
with respect to municipal liability in tort, does little to clarify the distinction and
may result in a change of emphasis from the local character of the interest to the
commercial character of the activity. Furthermore the litigation in tort cases in-
volving the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions has re-
sulted in confusion and inconsistency, affording a field day for law reviews. See,
for instance, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924).
The arbitrary nature of the distinction is illustrated by Griffith v. Butte, 72 Mont.
552, 2.84 Pac. 829 (1925). Street cleaning and sprinkling is a proprietary function,
but apparently becomes governmental when done by an employee of a health de-
partment or under a statute or ordinance declaring that it is for the protection of
public health.
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Although the latter theory has prevailed in most jurisdictions," the in-
fluence of an underlying theory of local self-government cannot be denied.
By "immemorial practice" local legislative powers have been vested in the
corporate authorities of municipalities, and this has never been regarded as
violative of the maxim that legislative powers must not be delegated.' Also,
local self-government is secured by constitutional provisions of varying
scope in several states. In Montana such constitutional provisions are
rather limited in scope. Article V, section 36, of the Montana Constitution,
provides:
The legislative assembly shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any power to make,
supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money,
property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy
taxes, or to perform any municipal functions whatever.
This prohibition upon legislative delegation refers only to those func-
tions having to do with local self-government.! It does not prevent delega-
tions of power to regularly elected or appointed state officials,' and the
words "special commission" refer to a body or association of individuals
which is not a department or branch of city government.'
2The historical basis for the theory of local self-government has been disputed; fur-
ther, Under our republican theory of government state legislatures have all powers
not limited by the state constitution, which should be construed as a legal docu-
ment the contents of which are not to be measured merely by the spirit of our in-
stitutions. However, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the legal merits
of implied reservations of municipal power. A supporting argument is found in
Eaton, The Right of Local Self-Government, 13 HARV. L. REV. 441, 570, 638 (1900).
A contrary argument is effectively presented in McBaln, The Doctrine of an In-
herent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLuM. L. Rsv. 190, 299 (1916).
3STASON, CASES ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 4 (1946) ; ADRIAN, GOVERNING URBAN
AMERICA 55 (1955). The earliest case enunciating the home rule doctrine was Peo-
ple ew rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871), opinion by Justice Cooley. In ad-
dition, the courts of Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky and Oklahoma have adopted the prin-
ciple. State ez rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N.W. 204, 57 L.R.A. 244
(1902); State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252, 4 L.R.A. 79
(1889); Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S.W. 477, 57 L.R.A 775 (1902) ;
Thomas v. Reed, 142 Okla. 38, 285 Pac. 92 (1930). See also People v. Lynch, 51
Cal. 15 (1875) ; Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. 1, 73 S.W. 811 (1903).
'Subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to local and
internal affairs is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a mu-
nicipal corporation proper. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 20 (4th ed. 1890).
For a review of the authorities, see McBain, The Delegation of Legislative Power
to Cities, 32 POL. ScI. Q. 276, 391 (1917).
'State em rel. Brooks v. Cook, 84 Mont. 478, 276 Pac. 958 (1929). See also State
ex rel. Berthot v. Gallatin County High School, 102 Mont. 356, 58 P.2d 264 (1936).
'State em rel. Missoula v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 47 P.2d 624 (1935) ; State em rel.
Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637 (1935) ; Public Service Commission
v. Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 Pac. 24 (1916).
"State ex rel. Quintin v. Edwards, 38 Mont. 250, 99 Pac. 940 (1908). See also Billings
Sugar Co. v. Fish, 40 Mont. 256, 106 Pac. 565 (1910), In which the court said that
there was no objection to the legislature availing "Itself of the ordinary machinery
of the county government, supplemented by the appointment of one additional offi-
cer, for the purpose of carrying the law Into effect."
[Vol. 19,
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 19 [1957], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol19/iss2/1
HOME RULE IN MONTANA
Article XII, section 4, provides:
The legislative assembly shall not levy taxes upon the in-
habitants or property in any county, city, town or municipal
corporation for county, town or municipal purposes, but may by
law invest in the corporate authorities thereof powers to assess
and collect taxes for such purposes.
The "municipal purposes" referred to are those involved in the exer-
cise of proprietary powers which are an incident to local self-government.
"Corporate authorities," which the legislature may invest with power to
assess and collect taxes for such purpose, are those municipal officers who
are either directly elected by the population of the municipality, or ap-
pointed in some mode to which it has given its assent.' The "levy" of
taxes contemplates compulsion, and the prohibition does not extend to legis-
lation merely authorizing the levy of taxes by political subdivisions," nor
to legislation curing irregularities in municipal action.' According to the
later decisions, only direct taxes are within this section of the Constitution,
and it does not condemn legislation requiring the expenditure of money by
a political subdivision which, but for the enactment of the law, it would not
expend.' The prohibition is not applicable to license taxes required of
persons doing business within the state, regardless of whether they are for
regulation or revenue,' nor to special assessments for local improvements.1'
On the other hand, this provision is applicable not only to burdens upon
property to defray general governmental expenditures, but also to taxes
upon "inhabitants." A statute requiring the payment of fees by petition-
ers filing letters of administration or guardianship, regulated by the ap-
praised value of the estate, to become a part of the public moneys of the
OState em rel. Housing Authority v. City Council, 108 Mont. 347, 90 P.2d 514 (1939);
State ex rel. Gebhardt v. City Council, 102 Mont. 27, 55 P.2d 671 (1936).
'State em rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734 (1910).
'Kraus v. Riley, 107 Mont. 116, 80 P.2d 864 (1938).
1Weber v. Helena, 89 Mont. 109, 297 Pac. 464 (1931).
"In Helena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steele, 20 Mont. 1, 49 Pac. 382, 37 L.R.A. 412
(1897), the court apparently held that legislation requiring a city to assume a
burden which would require an indebtedness necessitating the Imposition of taxes
for its discharge was obnoxious to article XII, section 4. In Hersey v. Neilson, 47
Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 30 (1913), the court refused to consider whether this section
would be violated by a law, which increased the costs of printing, since the record
did not show that costs would be increased and no such assumption was justified.
Later cases have departed entirely from the position apparently taken in the Steele
case. Rosebud County v. FIinn, 109 Mont. 537, 98 P.2d 330 (1940) ; State em rel.
Wilson v. Weir, 106 Mont. 526, 79 P.2d 305 (1938) ; ,tate v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256,
47 P.2d 624 (1935); State ez rel. Woare v. Board of Commissioners, 70 Mont. 252,
225 Pac. 389 (1924); Public Service Commission v. Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 Pac.
24 (1916). In the Holmes case, the court justified the Steele case on the ground
that the doctrine of local self-government, applicable to true municipal corporations,
independent of article XII, section 4, controlled.
"State v. Silver Bow County, 78 Mont. 1, 252 Pac. 301 (1926) ; State v. Camp Sing,
18 Mont. 128, 44 Pac. 516 (1896).
"Billings Sugar Co. v. Fish, 40 Mont. 256, 106 Pac. 565 (1910). See also State ex
rel. Hawkins v. State Board of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P.2d 116 (1934), hold-
ing that no tax was levied by legislation requiring counties having indigent patients
at the State Tuberculosis Sanitarium to pay that institution for their care.
1958]
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political subdivision, is within the prohibition.- Also, a per capita or poll
tax is included." And the Supreme Court of Montana, in a three to two
decision, has held that a retail sales tax is a tax upon "inhabitants.""
The Montana Constitution further provides:
The legislative assembly shall pass no law . . . which imposes
on the people of any county or municipal subdivision of the state,
a new liability in respect to transactions or consideration already
passed.'
No street or other railroad shall be constructed within any
city or town without the consent of the local authorities having
control of the street or highway proposed to be occupied by such
street or other railroad.'
Dissatisfied with the extent of independence of Montana cities and
towns, and believing them to be burdened by insufficient freedom to make
their own decisions and effectively govern themselves, the Montana Muni-
cipal League has proposed, as yet without success, a so-called home rule
amendment to the Montana Constitution.' The effect which the adoption
of such an amendment would have depends in part upon the extent to
which a doctrine of local home rule is recognized in Montana beyond what
is guaranteed by existing express constitutional provisions. Statements
seeming to justify an assertion that Montana has recognized an inherent
right of local self-government are to be found in the Montana cases, but
there may be set off against them statements to the contrary. No appre-
ciation of the status of cities and towns in Montana is possible without a
careful consideration of what the Supreme Court of Montana has actually
held, as well as what it has said.
INHERENT HOME RULE AS PROTECTION
AGAINST LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE
Conflicting Statements
The Supreme Court of the Montana Territory, in 1887, apparently
recognized that municipal corporations have no inherent right of local self-
go;ernment. In Davenport v. Kleinschmidt,' the court said:
The ordinary powers of municipal corporations are well de-
fined and understood. It is well said by Mr. Dillon, in his work
131lauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22, 94 Pac. 197 (1908).
"
8State e rel. Pierce v. Gowdy, 62 Mont. 119, 203 Pac. 1115 (1922).
"Lindeen v. Montana Liquor Control Board, 122 Mont. 549, 207 P.2d 947 (1949). Jus-
tices Angstman and Metcalf dissented, taking the position that the tax was a li-
cense tax and not upon inhabitants or property.
'
8MoNT. CONST. art. XV, § 13. If the legislation provi4es for liability dependent upon
favorable vote of the taxpaying freeholders of property within a city, this constitu-
tional provision is not violated. Stanley v. Great Falls, 86 Mont. 114, 132, 284 Pac.
134, 139 (1929).
"MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 12.
'A home rule bill (House Bill 144) in the Thirty-Fifth Legislative Assembly was
favored in the House by a vote of forty to thirty-nine, but failed because a constitu-
tional amendment requires a two-thirds vote. The League Executive Committee
has decided that home rule will be "one of the major pieces of legislation to be
stressed at the next session of the state legislature." Montana Municipal League,
News Letter, Aug., 1957.
216 Mont. 502, 527, 13 Pac. 249, 253 (1887).
[Vol. 19,
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on Municipal Corporations, that 'it is a general and undisputed
proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can
exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted
in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essen-
tial to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not
simply convenient, but indispensible. Any fair, reasonable doubt
concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against
the corporation, and the power is denied. Of every municipal
corporation, the charter or statute by which it is created is its or-
ganic act.' 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 55, p. 173.
Much later, in 1950, the Supreme Court of Montana was even more
specific. In Dietrich v. Deer Lodge.' the court said:
This court has repeatedly stated that unless the power is
vested in the municipality by express law or is necessarily implied
or essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of the munici-
pality the presumption is against the exercise by the city of any
such powers....
The inquiry must always be: '(1) Whether there is an ex-
press grant; (2) whether there is a grant by necessary implica-
tion; or (3) whether the power in question is indispensible to the
accomplishment of the object of the corporation....
n In this jurisdiction the municipal corporation possesses
no inherent power ....
In the sixty-three years intervening between the pronouncements of
these two cases, the same position was taken many times.
Nevertheless, eight years after the adoption of the Constitution of
Montana, the Supreme Court of Montana seemingly embraced the doctrine
of local self-government as conceived by the judge who first enunciated the
doctrine in the United States. In Helena Consolidated Water Co. v.
Steele, the following appears:
Discussing and distinguishing the questions here involved,
Judge Cooley, in People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich.
228, 15 Am. Rep. 206, says:
"In People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103, we consid-
ered at some length the proposition which asserts the amplitude
of legislative control over municipal corporations, and we there
conceded that, when confined, as it should be, to such corporations
as agencies of the state in its government, the proposition is en-
tirely sound. In all matters of general concern there is no local
right to act independently of the state; and the local authorities
cannot be permitted to determine for themselves whether they will
contribute through taxation to the support of the state govern-
ment, or to assist when called upon to suppress insurrection, or aid
in the enforcement of the police laws. Upon all such subjects the
state may exercise compulsory authority, and may enforce the per-
formance of local duties, either by employing local officers for the
2124 Mont. 8, 13, 218 P.2d 708, 711 (1950).
220 Mont. 1, 5, 49 Pae. 382, 383, 37 L.R.A. 412, 414 (1897).
1958]
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purpose, or through agents or officers of its own appointment ....
"But we also endeavored to show in People v. Hurlbut that,
though municipal authorities are made use of in state government,
and as such are under complete state control, they are not created
exclusively for that purpose, but have other objects and purposes
peculiarly local, and in which the state at large, except in con-
ferring the power and regulating its exercise, is legally no more
concerned than it is in the individual and private concerns of its
several citizens. * * * We also referred in People v. Hurlbut to sev-
eral decisions in the federal supreme court and elsewhere, to show
that municipal corporations considered as communities endowed
with peculiar functions for the benefit of their own citizens, have
always been recognized as possessing powers and capacities, and as
being entitled to exemptions, distinct from those which they pos-
sess or can claim as conveniences in state government. If the au-
thorities are examined, it will be found that these powers and
capacities, and the interests which are acquired under them are
usually spoken of as private in contra-distinction to those in which
the state is concerned, and which are called public, thus putting
these corporations, as regards all such powers, capacities, and in-
terests, substantially on the footing of private corporations."...
We think the two provisos of the law under discussion are in
violation of the clauses of the constitution quoted and referred to
above [article XII, section 4, and article XV, section 13], as well
as the spirit of our governmental system, which recognizes "that
the people of every hamlet, town and city of the state are entitled
to the benefits of local self-government." (Emphasis supplied).
As late as 1935 the Supreme Court of Montana repeated this doctrine.
In State v. Holmes," the court said:
The powers granted to a municipal corporation are of two
classes. "The first including those which are legislative, public, or
governmental, and import sovereignty; the second are those which
are proprietary or quasi-private, conferred for the private advan-
tage of the inhabitants of the city itself as a legal person."
As to the first class of powers of a city enumerated above,
the power of the legislature is supreme except as limited by ex-
press constitutional prohibitions; but as to the powers of the sec-
ond class wherein the city is acting in a proprietary capacity, as
distinguished from a governmental capacity, the theory of local
government controls.
In several other cases between the announcements in Helena Consoli-
dated Water Co. v. Steele and State v. Holmes, the Montana Supreme Court
reiterated this doctrine of local self-government. Obviously, such incon-
sistent statements invite examination and inquiry into whether the cases
may be reconciled.
Cases Stating the Legal Theory
Some of the apparent conflict disappears when the character of the
functions involved is considered. In many of the cases in which the language
"100 Mont. 256, 274, 47 P.2d 624, 629 (1935).
[Vol. 19,
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of the decision would seem to deny the existence of an inherent right of
local self-government, the court was dealing with a governmental, as dis-
tinguished from a proprietary, power. Helena v. Helena Light & Railway
Co. " involved an action by a city to enjoin a street railway company from
abandoning a portion of its line. The court held that the state Public
Service Commission would have power to relieve the railway company of
the burden imposed by the franchise which the city had granted, but ex-
pressly pointed out that the granting of the franchise by the city was an
act of government and that rights which the city might acquire in its pro-
prietary capacity were not involved. Also, in State ex. rel. Great Falls
Housing Authority v. Great Falls,' the court was considering the construc-
tion to be given the Housing Authority Act and referred to the act of the
city in carrying out the plan contemplated by the law as public or govern-
mental in nature.' In other cases it is reasonably clear that such was the
nature of the function involved or that it could be so considered, regardless
of whether the court so labeled it. Thus, Sharkey v. Butte,' concerned the
power of a city to annex territory.' In State ex. rel. Quintin v. Edwards,'
the court was speaking with reference to the action of a municipal corpor-
ation in reducing a police force.' In Bozeman v. Merrell,' the question
was the authority of a city to impose a penalty of imprisonment for the
possession of moonshine liquor.' In Helena Light and Railway Co. v. Hel-
ena the court was considering the validity of an ordinance requiring a
street railway to light its tracks within corporate limits. State v. North,
ern Pacific Railway Co.tm held that a city could not require a railroad to
construct a subway necessitating a change of the grade of a street, without
first complying with a statute requiring compensation to be paid to prop-
'63 Mont. 108, 207 Pac. 337 (1922).
"110 Mont. 318, 100 P.2d 915 (1940).
'In State ex rel. Helena Housing Authority v. City Council, 108 Mont. 347, 90 P.2d
514, the court said that the carrying out of the Housing Authority Act, involving
eradication of slums and the promotion of the public welfare of all citizens of the
state, constituted a public or governmental purpose, rather than a proprietary or
private one.
2'52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 26 (1916). See also Penland v. Missoula, 318 P.2d 1089
(Mont. 1957).
"As to the nature of the power of the state in establishing and changing municipal
boundaries, see 1 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 284 (2d ed. 1940). An act
of the legislature annexing territory to a municipal corporation does not violate the
right of local self-government. Attorney General v. Springwalls Township, 143
Mich. 523, 107 N.W. 87 (1906).
1140 Mont. 287, 106 Pac. 695 (1910).
"The organization and maintenance of municipal police departments involve the
exercise of governmental functions. 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 203
(2d ed. 1940) ; State ex rel. Gebhardt v. City Council, 102 Mont. 27, 55 P.2d 671
(1936) ; State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 151, 111 Pac. 734, 739 (1910).
1281 Mont. 18, 261 Pac. 876 (1927).
'Traffic in intoxicating liquor, gambling and prostitution have been held to be mat-
ters of state concern. State em rel. Burns v. Linn, 49 Okla. 526, 153 Pac. 826 (1915).
3447 Mont. 18, 130 Pac. 446 (1913).
tmAuthority conferred upon a municipal corporation to light its streets and other
public places has been held to be governmental in character. Bojko v. Minneapolis,
154 Minn. 167, 191 N.W. 399 (192).
"88 Mont. 529, 295 Pac. 257 (1930).
1958]
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erty owners.' In State ex rel. Billings v. Billings Gas Co.,' the court was
considering the authority of a city to fix by contract rates for a public
utility.'
Several cases have involved taxation, justifying a consideration of the
function as governmental.' Shapard v. Missoula" dealt with efforts to
create a special improvement district." In Wibaux Improvement Co. v.
Breitenfeldt," the court was speaking of the power of a municipal corpor-
ation to levy taxes, although it is true that they were for municipal pur-
poses. In Dietrich v. Deer Lodge, sup-ra, the question was as to the power
of a city or town to issue general obligation bonds for paving and widening
its streets."
In Broadwater v. Kendig," the court was speaking of the controlling
effect of a statute prev enting a city from increasing salaries of officers
during their term of office, as applied to an ordinance increasing the sal-
'"The court said that the state statute, whether necessary or not under article III,
section 14, of the Constitution of Montana, constitued a part of the law under which
the city might exercise the police power effecting a change in the grade of a street.
That the city would be acting in a governmental capacity in changing the grade of
a street, see Jenkins v. City of Henderson, 214 N.C. 244, 199 S.E. 37 (1938). But
cf. Northern Pacific Railway v. Duluth, 153 Minn. 122, 189 N.W. 937 (1922);
Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943 (1897) ; Salsbury v. Lincoln,
117 Neb. 465, 220 N.W. 827 (1928).
855 Mont. 102, 173 Pac. 799 (1918).
'*The power to regulate rates of a public utility is within the sovereign power of the
state, but is not a power appertaining to the government of a city and does not fol-
low as an incident of the power to frame a charter for city government. State
ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co., 189 Mo. 83, 8S S.W. 41 (1905).
'"There has been some conflict as to whether particular functions relating to taxa-
tion, are governmental, and especially whether local assessments and special taxes
are governmental in nature. See 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 195 n. 94,
§ 196 n. 19; 20 (2d ed. 1940) ; 37 AM. JuR., Municipal Corporations § 108 (1941). Cf.
Mr. Justice Adair's special concurring opinion in Dietrich v. Deer .Lodge, 124 Mont.
8, 18, 218 P.2d 708, 713 (1940), in which he quoted from Corpus Juris Secondum as
follows: "The right of a municipality to issue bonds is not a political or govern-
mental power, but is rather a private corporate power conferred for local purposes.
The issuance of general bonds to be paid for by general taxation is, however, recog-
nized as a governmental act." Cf. also the dissent of Justice Angstman in Weber v.
Helena, 89 Mont. 109, 146, 297 Pac. 464, 467 (1931), taking the position that the
home rule doctrine was violated by an act curing the defect in and validating city
water plant bonds, since the legal effect was to compel the city to issue the bonds.
But cf. article XII, section 8, of the Constitution of Montana, providing that the
legislative assembly may provide for the funding of public corporate debts by as-
sessment and taxation of private property within the territory of the corporation,
and the decision in State ex rel. Gebhardt v. City Council, 102 Mont. 27, 55 P.2d
671 (1936), referring to this provision as giving to the legislature jurisdiction to
control the economic and financial affairs of a city.
'149 Mont. 269, 141 Pac. 544 (1914).
"The court said that the mode prescribed by statute had to be substantially followed,
and that this was particularly true "when it is engaged in making street improve-
ments, the' expense of which is to be a charge by assessment upon the property in-
eluded in a special improvement district." Id. at 279, 141 Pac. at 547.
"67 Mont. 206, 215 Pac. 222 (1923).
"Cf. the language of the opinions in McClintoch v. Great Falls, 53 Mont. 221, 163
Pac. 99 (1917) (discussing the construction to be placed on the limitation of in-
debtedness provision of article XIII, section 6, of the Constitution of Montana),
and Gagnan v. Butte, 75 Mont. 279, 243 Pac. 1085 (1926) (holding that a city which
had failed to collect taxes as required by statute was not liable on special improve-
ment bonds).
"80 Mont. 515, 261 Pac. 264 (1927).
[Vol. 19,
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ary of the mayor. This might be considered a governmental matter," al-
though the court did cite with approval a Delaware case' which refused
to distinguish the dual character of a municipal corporation or recognize
any theory of local self-government.
In several of these cases, furthermore, the statements of the Montana
Supreme Court which would seem to deny any right of local self-govern-
ment were made in construing a grant of power by the legislature, and for
that reason were not necessary to the decision.' And there are still other
cases in which statements of the more limited view of municipal power are
obiter dictum. In Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, supra, the court merely
held that a grant by a city of the exclusive right to sell to the city all the
water required by it for sewerage and fire purposes for twenty years, at a
minimum rate fixed by contract, was void because it created a monopoly
contrary to the genius of free government, was for an unreasonable time
and exceeded the debt limit prescribed by the city charter. Such a holding
was not dependent upon rejection of a theory of local self-government.
Harris v. Polson" held that a park board appointed by a city council had
no authority to lease property for a purpose other than that for which it
had been conveyed to the city.
State ex rel. Haley v. Dilworth,' dealt with a quasi-municipal corpor-
ation and stated the general rule as to such a corporation, that "a public
corporation in this state has no power to act unless authority to do so is
conferred by a statute or necessarily implied therefrom." The case is of
interest only because it cites as authority for this statement cases dealing
with true municipal corporations,' thus perhaps suggesting that there is
no distinction as to their powers.
4Apparently whether the fixing of compensation for municipal officers is treated as
a governmental, as distinct from a proprietary, function is dependent upon whether
the officer is exercising a governmental or proprietary function. See Lexington
v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, G8 S.W. 477, 57 L.R.A. 775 (1902), regarding compensa-
tion of officers and members of the fire department; Board of Aldermen v. Hunt,
284 Ky. 720, 145 S.W.2a 814 (1940), regarding salaries of city water commissioners.
Of course, a mayor, as the chief executive officer of a city or town, would have
the duty to cause all ordinances to be executed, whether they related to govern-
mental or proprietary functions. (REvISED CoiES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 11-802
(Hereinafter the REViSED CODE:S OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.) ). Also, under the
commission form of government the mayor participates in the legislative functions,
regardless of the character of the legislation (R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3120), as is true
under the commission-manager plan (R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3245).
Cf. State ex rel. Gebhardt v. City Council, 102 Mont. 27, 55 P.2d 671 (1936), sus-
taining legislation fixing salaries for policemen in cities, in which the principal
dispute was over the construction of article XII, section 4, of the Constitution of
Montana, prohibiting the legislature from levying taxes upon inhabitants or proper-
ty for county or municipal purposes. The court referred to article V, section 26 as
implying legislative power to enact general laws creating offices and prescribing
the powers and duties of offices in counties, cities, townships and school districts.
The obiter dictum seems to indicate that under the Montana Constitution the legis-
lature may control the appointment and salaries of officers performing local func-
tions.
"Coyle v. Gray, 7 Houst. 44, 30 Atl. 728 (1884).
"For a consideration of cases interpreting power delegated, see infra at 90-94.
"123 Mont. 469, 215 P.2l 950 (1950).
'NO Mont. 102, 258 Pac. 246 (1927).
"'State ex rel. Billings v. Billings Gas Co., 55 Mont. 102, 173 Pac. 799 (1918) ; State
ex rel. Quintin v. Edwards, 40 Mont. 287, 106 Pac. 695 (1910).
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Cases Enunciating the Doctrine
of Local Self-Government
Consideration of the cases enunciating the theory of local self-govern-
ment discloses that all but two are inconclusive. In the first case to state
the doctrine, Helena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steele, supra, it appears
that a statute provided that no municipality having a water supply fur-
nished by a private person should erect any water plant to be operated by
itself, but, if it desired to acquire such a plant, should purchase that owned
by such private person. This was held to be in conflict with article XII,
section 4, of the Constitution, since the purchase would require the city to
incur an indebtedness necessitating the imposition of taxes for its dis-
charge; also to be in conflict with article XV, section 13, as imposing upon
the people of the municipality a new liability in respect to a past transac-
tion, since at the time of the enactment of the statute the city had a con-
tract with the water company which reserved the right of the city to enter
into contracts with and purchase water from any other person or corpor-
ation for city purposes.' In State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards,' the court
held that a statute creating in cities of the first class boards of park com-
missioners, the members of which were to be appointed by the governor,
and empowering them to raise by taxation such sums as they deemed neces-
sary to carry on their work, was in conflict with article XII, section 4, of
the Constitution of Montana, although the court also stated that it did
.violence "to the theory of local self-government which has been established
in this state as one of the fundamental principles of our government." In
Lindeen v. Montana Liquor Control Board," the court quoted at length the
language in State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, which stated the doctrine of
local self-government. But the court merely held that an act authorizing
the Montana Liquor Control Board to collect a tax on the retail selling price
of all liquors sold, and to distribute the tax to the counties in proportion to
the amount of liquor sold therein, was violative of article XII, section 4, of
the Constitution. Since the local self-government doctrine has no applica-
tion to counties, it is apparent that it was not in point. ' In Hersey v. Neil-
52Even the purported reliance upon the theory of local self-government would seem
to be weakened by Public Service Commission v. Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 Pac. 24
(1916), holding that a city, in the management of a water supply system acquired
by extending Its indebtedness beyond the three per centum constitutional limit, was
subject to all reasonable regulations and control by the state acting by virtue of its
police power, even though the Constitution (article XIII, section 6) provides that
the municipality shall "own and control" such water supply. Apparently the court
considered regulation and control by the state to involve a matter of general state
concern because contaminated water might spread disease; and the court said that
the legislation which was in dispute and which gave supervision to the public serv-
ice commission was not intended to take from the city the active management of
its water plant or the authority to appoint officers and employees to operate it, or
to interfere with such officers in the proper discharge of their duties. Cf. Camp-
bell v. Helena, 92 Mont. 366, 16 P.2d 1 (1932), holding that a city could be held
liable in an action for damages resulting from drinking contaminated water fur-
nished by the city, since where the city operates its own water system and furnishes
water on a rental basis it acts in a proprietary capacity.
542 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734 (1910).
"122 Mont. 549, 207 P.2d 947 (1949).
"Mr. Justice Angstman, in his dissent in which Mr. Justice Metcalf concurred, said
that the home rule doctrine shed no light on the question of whether the "sales
[Vol. 19,
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son,' the court sustained a statute providing that county printing must be
done within the state, and referred to the doctrine of local self-government
in holding that it was inapplicable."
Thus, one finds several cases, beginning in 1897, in which the Supreme
Court of Montana affirmed that an inherent right to local self-government
was established in our polity, but in which the statements of the theory may
be explained away as either quite beside the question decided or unneces-
sary to the decisions. However, in 1935 two cases were decided which seem
to defy explanation on any other basis than that of acceptance of the self-
government doctrine. In State v. Holmes, supra, there was involved an
act of the legislature requiring state insurance of public buildings of the
state and its political subdivisions. The court held that the act was valid
as to counties and school districts but invalid as to cities and towns, because
the theory of local self-government controlled as to cities and towns but not
as to counties and school districts. The court rejected arguments that the
act violated express constitutional limitations,' and based the decision on
the foundation of the Steele case, which it said in turn was rested on the
decisions of the Michigan court. It said:
When operating in its proprietary capacity a city is subject
to the same burdens, responsibilities and liabilities as a private
corporation or individual acting in the same capacity.... If the
city, when acting in its proprietary capacity, is subject to the
burdens, responsibilities and liabilities of others acting in such
capacity, it is entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities ac-
corded others....
Most cities have a city hall, which is the office building
wherein its affairs are conducted. If the city has a water plant,
there the water bills are collected and its business in connection
therewith conducted. Likewise, with its other business activities.
No one would assume to assert that the proprietor of a private
water company who maintains an office building in which he col-
lects water rentals from the inhabitants of the city and conducts
its business affairs could be compelled under a valid exercise of
the police power to insure such office building against the perils
enumerated in this Act in a state insurance fund. If such concern
tax" was a tax on "inhabitants or property" within the county so as to come within
the language of the constitution, and that It seemed to him that discussion of the
"home rule" doctrine when dealing with the subject of intoxicating liquors might
have far reaching consequences.
"47 Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 30 (1913).
"See also State e., rel. Woare v. Board of Commissioners, 70 Mont. 252, 225 Pac. 389(1924).
5It was argued that there was a violation of article XII, section 4, of the Constitu-
tion of Montana, in that perils to be insured against were not then ordinarily the
subject of insurance and in order to secure such insurance it would be necessary
for counties and school districts to expend additional sums, and that, therefore, the
act indirectly levied a tax. In refusing to accept this argument the court em-
phasized that there was no direct levy of a tax, and the court distinguished theSteele case on the ground that it dealt with a true municipal corporation. See
note 12, supra. Further, the court held that there was no violation of article V, sec-
tion 36, since, if any power was delegated, it was delegated. to regularly elected or
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may not be compelled to insure, neither may the city, for to com-
pel such insurance is to deprive an individual, a private corpor-
ation, or a city in its proprietary capacity of its property, namely,
its money paid in premiums, witiout due process of law. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
In State ex rel. Kern v. Arnold,' the court held that a legislative at-
tempt to set up a compulsory three-platoon system for municipal fire de-
partments, and prescribe the compensation to be paid to firemen, invaded
the proprietary rightse of the city of Missoula and deprived the city of its
property without due process of law. The court in its opinion did not even
mention argument of counsel that there was a violation of article XII, sec-
tion 4, of the Constitution of Montana, but based its decision squarely on
the theory of local self-government and due process of law. The court said:
If in owning the equipment and property used in a fire de-
partment and in employing firemen the city is acting in its pro-
prietary capacity, then the Act in question, which of necessity re-
quires the city to employ additional firemen at additional expense
and to pay others additional compensation, operates to deprive
the city of property without due process of law in contravention
of the provisions of section 27 of article III of the Constitution.
If, on the other hand, when engaged in these activities the city is
exercising a governmental function, the will of the legislature is
supreme.
Cases Interpreting Powers Delegated
To the extent that a municipal corporation owes its powers to the legis-
lature, it should make no difference in the interpretation of a legislative
act whether or not a theory of home rule based upon an implied constitu-
tional reservation of powers be adopted. This would apply to all delega-
tions of governmental powers. So far as proprietary powers are con -k
cerned, if a court accepted such a home rule theory it might avoid inter-
preting a legislative act as applicable to municipal corporations, in order
to avoid holding the act invalid; otherwise it would seem that acceptance
or rejection of this home rule theory would be without effect on principles
of interpretation. '
'100 Mont. 346, 49 P.2d 976 (1935).
'The court arrived at the conclusion that proprietary rights were involved by taking
judicial notice that firemen spend a good deal of. time doing something other than
going to and from fires, extinguishing fires, and testing equipment. It said, "We
conclude that a city operates a fire department in its proprietary capacity, except
where the fire department is engaged in the extinguishment of fires, going to and
from the scenes of such conflagrations, or in, testing equipment for use on such oc-
casions, etc.; then it may be said on the grounds of public policy based largely
upon the grounds of necessity [the public policy of relieving cities from excessive
burdens of liability or negligence of the fire department] . . . that It is exercising
governmental functions." The court also said that adhering to the theory of local
home rule has had the effect of classifying the functions of a municipal corpora-
tion as proprietary to a greater degree than has been observed by courts of otherjurisdictions not applying this theory. It distinguished State ex rel. Brooks v.
Cook, 84 Mont. 478, 276 Pac. 958 (1929), whicli held that a statute creating the of-
fice of state fire marshall with powers to maintain actions to require the condemna-
tion of fire hazards was not unconstitutional as violating article V. section 36, of
the Constitution of Montana, since "in enforcing a statute or ordinance valid as
an exercise of the police power, a city is of necessity acting In behalf of the
sovereign state and performing a governmental function."61C/. Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919), and Bird, J.. dissenting
in Bowler v. Nagel, 228 Mich. 434, 200 N.W. 258 (1924).
[Vol. 19,
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In State v. City Council,' the Supreme Court of Montana apparently
was influenced by the theory of local self-government in interpreting a dele-
gation to cities and towns of power with respect to the granting and refus-
ing of liquor licenses. The court said that it had long been the policy of
the legislature to vest in local municipal authorities the power to determine
local affairs, and if the court said that any provision of the statute author-
izing the Liquor Control Board to issue retail licenses conflicted with the
power of the city it would "reverse and interfere with the long estab-
lished policy theretofore harmoniously maintained between state and mu-
nicipal authority." It is submitted that such an approach is erroneous,
if it be recognized that a governmental power was involved.' In Wiley v.
District Court,. the above-mentioned case was considered to have been over-
ruled, so far as it sustained the power of the city to limit beer licenses when
to do so would have the effect of nullifying the license issued by the Liquor
Board.'
In many cases concerned with what may be considered governmental
powers, the court has adhered to the rule generally stated that powers con-
ferred upon municipal corporations are to be strictly construed, and that,
in case of doubt as to the existence of a power, the doubt should be re-
solved against the corporation. This, of course, follows from a recognition
of the subordinate position of the municipal corporation. In Wibaux Im-
provement District v. Breitenfeldt, supra, the court, in considering the
power of a municipal corporation to levy taxes, said that any doubt of the
power would be resolved against the municipality and the right to exercise
the power withheld, citing Sharkey v. Butte, supra, which dealt with the
power of annexation. Bozeman v. Merrell, supra, held that a city had no
power to prescribe by ordinance a prison sentence for the maintenance of
a nuisance, under statutes delegating power to impose a fine for the mainte-
nance of a nuisance and to impose a fine and imprisonment for the violation
of a city ordinance. In Helena Light and Railway Co. v. Helena, supra, it
was held that a statute granting to cities power to compel the lighting of
railroad tracks within the city at the expense of the owner referred only to
"commercial" as distinct from street railways. In McGillie v. Corby," it
was held that a city had no power, by virtue of a statute providing that any
acting mayor performing the duties of mayor for more than sixty days
should be entitled to the salary of mayor, to provide that any acting mayor
should be entitled to the salary of the mayor. And in State ex rel. Billings
v. Billings Gas Co., supra, the court held that a statute giving power to cities
to permit the use of the streets for the purpose of laying down gas mains and
to make all contracts necessary to carry into effect the power thus granted
and provide for the manner of executing the same, gave to the city power
'107 Mont. 216, 82 P.2(1 587 (1938).
'See note 33, supra.
"'118 Mont. 50, 164 P.2d 358 (1945).
'Mr. Justice Morris dissented; also, Mr. Justice Angstman, who wrote the opinion
for the court, changed his mind and dissented from the denial of a petition for re-
hearing. One who studies these cases will witness an interesting conflict between
basic philosophies of municipal government. Cf. Stephens v. Great Falls, 119 Mont.
368, 175 P.2d 408 (1946).
837 Mont. 249, 95 Pac. 1063 (1908).
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to contract for rates with a public utility subject to the paramount author-
ity of the state to exercise its power to regulate rates."
Influenced by the same view with respect to the interpretation of dele-
gated power, the position has been taken that when the mode of exercising
a power is pointed out in the statute granting it, the mode thus prescribed
must be followed. Thus, in Shapard v. Missoula, supra, the court held that
efforts to create a special improvement district were nugatory because the
procedure specified by statute was not followed. In Dietrich v. Deer Lodge,
supra, it was held that a city had no power to issue general obligation bonds
for paving and widening streets, since a statute provided for special as-
sessments and the creation of special improvement districts, while there was
no grant of authority to issue general obligation bonds. And in Mountain
States Power Co. v. Forsyth,' the United States District Court for Mon-
tana held that under a statute authorizing a city to acquire an electric
plant upon credit of the city by borrowing money and issuing bonds, a dity
could not enter into a contract with a construction company for construc-
tion of such a plant for a sum payable in monthly installments out of the
earnings of the plant.
The same view of powers delegated to cities accounts for holdings ad-
verse to the municipality where the city and the state legislate with re-
spect to the same subject matter. Again the question is one of statutory
construction, and if the state regulatory act contains a proviso permitting
municipal action the court has had no trouble sustaining the municipal
ordinance. Thus, in Carey v. Guest, an ordinance regulating speed, rather
than a state statute, was held to control, since the statute had a proviso
"that cities and towns may, by ordinance, regulate speed and traffic upon
the streets within the incorporated limits. " In the absence of such pro-
viso, however, there is difficulty. In State ex rel. Butte v. District Court,"
it appears that the legislature expressly delegated to cities the power to de-
fine and punish vagrancy, although the penal code also contained such a
definition and provision for punishment. The court sustained a prosecu-
tion for violation of the municipal ordinance. But in Bozeman v. Merrell,
supra, the court said that although the legislature had delegated to cities
the power to define nuisances, yet this authority merely meant that the city
might declare in conformity with state statutes what should constitute a
07The court pointed out that there are three lines of cases: (1) holding that statutes
of the character involved do not confer any rate making power whatever on the
city; (2) holding that such a statute by necessary implication confers the power
to fix rates for a definite period; and (3) holding, as does the principal case, that
the statute confers powers to fix rates subject to the paramount right of the state
to exercise its power to regulate rates whenever It chooses. It Is interesting to
note that the only case cited to support the second line of cases Is a Michigan case,
Boerth v. Detroit Gas Co., 152 Mich. 654, 116 N.W. 628, 18 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1197
(1908). Although Michigan is the birth place of the theory of an inherent right
of local self-government, reference to the Michigan case shows that this decision
was not based upon that theory.
a 4 1 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1941), rev'd because of want of federal Jurisdiction,
127 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1942).
a 78 Mont. 415, 258 Pac. 236 (1927).
7°See also Markinovich v. Tierney, 93 Mont. 73, 17 P.2d 92 (1932), sustaining an ordi-
nance regulating speed and traffic within the city limits, although there was state
legislation regulating traffic on public highways.
n37 Mont. 202, 95 Pac, 841 (1908).
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nuisance." Even if the ordinance does conform to the state law, difficulty
is present. Apparently the degree of particularity in the delegation to the
municipality is of importance. In Billings v. Herold," the court held that
the drunken driving provisions of the state's Motor Vehicle Act prevailed
over the city ordinance enacted merely by virtue of a general delegation of
power to regulate traffic, motor vehicles and their speed, and to pass ordi-
nances necessary for the government and management of the affairs of the
city and the execution of the powers vested in it."
None of the above cases are dependent upon the acceptance or rejec-
tion of a theory of an inherent right of local self-government, nor are they
particularly significant in determining whether or not such a theory exists
in this state. There is one case, however, dealing with the interpretation
of delegated powers which may be thought to sustain a thesis that the court
has adopted the view that a municipal corporation is entitled to the pro-
tection of due process so far as its proprietary functions are concerned,
just as is a private corporation, independent of any reserved rights theory.
The case is Milligan v. Miles City." In that case the court held that a city
which was authorized to conduct an electric light and power plant could
lay a main to heat a city building by the waste steam from the plant and
incidentally furnish steam for heat to private buildings abuting on the
main, since its authorization to conduct a power plant impliedly authorized
it to do so in the usual manner in which such business is conducted by pri-
vate persons or corporations. But this decision is dissimulating in char-
acter ;" and, moreover, its significance becomes a matter of doubt when one
considers that it is a general rule that legislative grants are to be strictly
construed even when dealing with private corporations." Certainly the
line between the construction of a charter to determine what powers are
granted and the construction of the powers which are granted to determine
their scope is not easy to draw; and strict construction is a relative term
"The state statute provided that a public nuisance is one which endangers public
health, safety, peace or comfort of thel whole community or a considerable number
of people. The ordinance made possession of intoxicating liquor a nuisance. The
court said that this was in conflict with the state statute, although, of course, the
ordinance did not purport to make legal anything defined by state law as a nuis-
ance.
"296 P.2d 263 (Mont. 1956).
"The 1957 legislature changed the law, by expressly authorizing citie,9 to adopt traf-
fic regulations not in conflict with statutory provisions. LAWS OF MONT., 1967, C.
201. Questions mayl arise as to what is to be regarded as in "conflict." See note
72, eupra, and the specific authorziations of sections 39(d) and 40(c) of Chapter
201, Laws of Montana, 1957. And see Legislative Summary, 18 MONTANA L. REV.
121, 124 (1957), suggesting that doubt raised by the Herold case as to just when
municipalities may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the state in the crim-
inal field is heightened by a suspicion arising from that case that the Supreme
Court wishes to limit such concurrent jurisdiction so as to limit a second prose-
cution for the same alleged criminal act.
Compare Helena v. Kent, 32 Mont. 279, 80 Pac. 258 (1905), dealing with the
power of a city under a general delegation in the absence of state legislation
upon the subject. The court sustained under the "general welfare clause" the
power of a city to make it the duty of the occupant of premises to remove snow
and ice from the sidewalk upon which the property abuts.
51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 276, L.R.A. 1916C 395 (1915).
"See p. 96 infra.
'13 AM. JuE., Corporations, § 741 (1938) ; 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 6502 (3d ed. 1943).
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having little, if any, meaning in the abstract. It will vary in degree, ac-
cording to the nature of the statute and the rights and persons affected
thereby."5 In fact, Judge Dillon's classic statement of municipal powerse
itself contains an ambiguity as to implied powers, since it at the same time
limits implied powers to those necessarily implied and permits the inclusion
of those fairly implied.
It would seem, therefore, that none of the cases dealing with the inter-
pretation of delegated powers are of much significance as bearing upon
either the existence or scope of self-government in Montana.
Evaluation of Cases
It has been said that Montana has exhibited "the 'inherent right' doc-
trine in all of its logical perfection."' It also has been said that Montana
has not embraced a theory of local self-government as a right reserved to
the people in the Constitution, but merely has recognized that municipal
corporations are protected as private corporations in the management of
their proprietary or private affairs by the due process clause of the state
constitution."' Any case for an inherent right theory in Montana depends
upon a satisfactory explanation or rejection of the many cases stating the
legal theory of municipal powers and rights, and, it would seem, upon the
Holmes and Kern cases. Certainly the Holmes and Kern cases do no more
than hold that a municipal corporation is entitled to the protection of the
state guarantee against taking property without due process of law when
operating in a proprietary capacity.
However, such holdings would seem to be dependent upon accep-
tance of a theory of implied reservations of powers, rights or property in
the state constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States had that
problem before it in Trenton v. New Jersey.' The City of Trenton, as suc-
cessor to a grant made by New Jersey to a private corporation claimed a
perpetual right, unburdened by license fee or other charge, to divert all the
water that might be required for the use of the city or its inhabitants from
the Delaware River, and resisted a charge imposed by state statute for
water diverted. In holding that the city could not invoke the contract
clause or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, even assuming that the private corporation might have done so if
its rights had not passed to the city, the Court said:
The distinction between the municipality as an agent of the
State for governmental purposes and as an organization to care
for local needs in a private or proprietary capacity has been ap-
plied in various branches of the law of municipal corporations.
The most numerous illustrations are found in cases involving the
question of liability for negligent acts or omissions of its officers
73 SUTHERLAND, Op. Cit. Stpra § 5501.
"See p. 82-P.3 supra.
"'OWDHAM, LOCAL GOVERMENT LAW 45 (1949).
8 1Note, Montana Muticipalitie.t: Local Self-Government, 13 MONTANA L. REV. 43
(1952).
-262 U.S. 182 (1923).
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and agents. See Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U.S. 650,
and cases cited. . . . Recovery is denied where the act or omission
occurs in the exercise of what are deemed to be governmental pow-
ers, and is permitted if it occurs in a proprietary capacity. The
basis for the distinction is difficult to state, and there is no es-
tablished rule for the determination of what belongs to the one or
the other class. It originated with the courts. Generally it is ap-
plied to escape difficulties, in order that injustice may not result
from the recognition of technical defenses based upon the govern-
mental character of such corporations. But such distinction fur-
nishes no ground for the application of constitutional restraints
sought to be invoked by the City of Trenton against the State of
New Jersey. They do not apply as against the state in favor of its
own municipalities. We hold that the city cannot invoke these
provisions of the Federal Constitution against the imposition of
the license fee or charge for diversion of water specified in the
state law here in question. . ..
Of course, a state is free to interpret its own due process clause differ-
ently than the Supreme Court of the United States interprets the due proc-
ess clause of the Federal Constitution, just as a state is free to find an im-
plied reservation of powers in its own constitution. But no satisfactory
explanation for the difference in interpretation of state and federal due
process provisions has been suggested, other than the implied reservation
upon which the doctrine of an inherent right of local self-government is
based. The position of the municipality as a corporation with the right to
sue and be sued, and "subject to many of the same liabilities, burdens, and
responsibilities as are others acting in proprietary capacities,' '" is not
peculiar to Montana. A distinction between the management of proprietary
affairs and the government of local affairs does not help. Each involves a
course of action in a matter of primary interest to local inhabitants, but
neither would be protected against state action if the municipality were
recognized as a mere political subdivision of the state under a constitution
vesting all legislative powers in the state legislature except as expressly
prohibited. Furthermore, if such an interpretation of due process is pos-
sible without recognition of an implied reservation of power in the con-
stitution, counties and cities would be entitled to like protection in Mon-
tana, since counties also are bodies corporate" with power to sue and be
sued" and while engaged in proprietary functions have been held to be
liable for torts committed by their agents.' The fact that cases holding
counties liable for torts of agents and employees are based upon an inter-
pretation of the statute giving counties power to sue and be sued' would
not seem to be material. If due process protects the municipality from leg-
islative deprivations because it is subject to liabilities, it would seem to do
"See also Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); Monaghan v. Armitage, 218
Minn. 108, 15 N.W.2d 241 (1944), appeal disiss.ed, 323 U.S. 681 (1945).
'See note 81, supra, at 45.
R.C.M. 1947, § 16-801.
*R.C.M. 1947, § 16-804.
'Johnson v. Billings, 101 Mont. 402, 54 P.2d 579 (1936) ; Jacoby v. Choteau County,
112 Mont. 70, 112 P.2d 1068 (1941). See also Note, liabilitI, of Counties for Negli-
gent Acts and Omi4sions of their Employees and Officers, 3 MONTANA L. REV. 128
(1942) ; Note, State Immunity from Tort Liability, 8 MON.TA.qA L. REV. 45 (1947).
'See note 81, supra, at 50 n. 40.
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so regardless of whether the liabilities exist as the result of common law or
statute.
The property of which the municipality was said to be deprived in the
Holmes case was "money paid in premiums" for insurance on buildings.
In the Kern case, apparently it was the money which would have to be ex-
pended to employ additional firemen at additional compensation. But the
expenditure of such money would merely mean that the city would have
to impose additional taxes. The city perhaps may be considered the rep-
resentative of the taxpayers, but it is difficult to explain their standing
to object, since the legislature could authorize the city to impose the tax,
unless a constitutional limitation upon legislative interference with the
municipality be found. And it would seem that whatever limitation upon
legislative compulsion to impose a tax for local purposes was intended by
the framers of the constitution was incorporated within the express pro-
visions of article XII, section 4, which the court held in the Holmes case
was not violated.
The reality of the situation in Montana is that the decisions are con-
fused and conflicting. In fact, on occasion the court has embraced both
the legal theory and the doctrine of an inherent right of local self-govern-
ment in the same decision. Thus, in Milligan v. Miles City, supra, the
court stated that the statute is the measure of power granted to a municipal
corporation and that the inquiry must always be "(1) Whether there is
an express agent; (2) whether there is a grant by necessary implication;
or (3) whether the power in question is indispensible to the accomplish-
ment of the object of the corporation." But the court then stated that a
city operating a municipal light plant under legislative authority acts in
a proprietary capacity and stands on the same footing as a private indi-
vidual or business corporation similarly situated and cited, inter alia, Hel-
ena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steele, supra. Advocates of municipal home
rule may well be encouraged to seek a clarifying amendment to our funda-
mental law.
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The home rule amendment proposed by the Montana Municipal
League,' is patterned after the Model Constitutional Provisions for Munic-
ipal Home Rule drafted by Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean of the Law
School of the University of Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Committee on
Home Rule of the American Municipal Association. The proposal is to
amend article XVI of the Constitution of Montana, by adding sections 9
and 10 to the present 8 sections.
Charter Making
The added section 9 would provide the method for home rule charter
making as follows:
The qualified electors of any municipal corporation are
granted the power to adopt a home rule charter of government
and to amend or repeal the same. The adoption of a charter or
the amendment or repeal of a charter shall be proposed either by
"See note 20, supra.
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a resolution of the governing body of a municipal corporation or
by a charter commission consisting of not less than seven (7)
members.
Upon resolution approved by a majority of the members of
the governing body of any municipal corporation, or upon petition
of ten (10) per centum of the qualified electors of a municipal
corporation, as determined by the total vote cast at the last pre-
ceding annual election, the governing body of a municipal corpor-
ation shall submit the question of the election of a charter com-
mission to the electors of the municipal corporation at any annual
election or at a special election called for that purpose. An af-
firmative vote of a majority of the qualified electors voting on the
question shall authorize the creation of a charter commission.
The resolution of the governing body or the petition to elect
a charter commission may include the names of candidates for
election to the charter commission and such candidates may be
nominated by separate petition or by resolution of the governing
body, or by both such methods. The charter commission candi-
dates in a number equal to the number to be elected, who receive
the most votes, shall constitute the commission. On the death,
resignation or inability of any member of a charter commission
to serve, the remaining members shall elect a successor. The quali-
fied electors of municipal corporation may not elect a charter
commission more often than once in two (2) years.
The charter commission shall have authority to propose (1)
the adoption of a charter, (2) amendment of a charter or par-
ticular part or parts of a charter or (3) repeal of a charter, or
any of these actions, as specified in the resolution of the govern-
ing body or in the petition as the case may be.
All proposals shall be submitted to the vote of the qualified
electors at an annual or special election. Any part of a proposed
home rule charter may be submitted for separate vote. Alterna-
tive sections or articles of a proposed home rule charter may be
submitted and the section or article receiving the larger vote
shall, in each instance, prevail if a charter is adopted. In case of
proposed charter amendments, there may likewise be separate or
alternative submission. The adoption of a charter, or of any part
of a charter submitted for separate vote or of any charter amend-
ment submitted for separate vote, or the repeal of a charter shall
be made by majority vote of the qualified electors voting on the
question. If a charter amendment is submitted in the alternative
the alternative amendment receiving the most votes shall prevail
provided a majority of the qualified electors voting on the ques-
tion of amendment vote in favor of the same.
The Legislature shall provide by statute, not inconsistent
with the provisions of this section, the procedure relating to the
election and establishment of a charter commission, the duration
thereof, the framing, publication and submission to the qualified
electors of all proposals and questions arising under the provisions
hereof, and for such other procedure as may be necessary to make
this section effective, and may provide by statute for a number
of charter commission members in excess of seven (7) on the basis
of population. In the absence of such legislation, the governing
body of a municipal corporation in which the adoption, amend-
1.958]
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ment or repeal of a charter is proposed, shall provide by ordi-
nance or resolution for such procedure, and the number of char-
ter commission members shall be seven. (7). The governing body,
if it defaults in the exercise of this authority, may be compelled,
by judicial mandate, to exercise the same.
Thus the adoption, amendment or repeal of a home rule charter must
be proposed either by the governing body of the municipal corporation or
by a charter commission, and all such proposals must be submitted to the
qualified voters. State legislation is not necessary to render home rule
available; neither is the charter making process subject to defeat by the
governing body of the municipal corporation, since mandamus is available
to compel action. On the other hand, voters cannot formulate charter pro-
posals in the first instance. As a comment to the model draft states, "This
stresses the importance of the deliberative process in shaping charter pro-
visions," but the qualified voters "constitute the municipal sovereign.'
'0
Charter Powers
The proposed section 10 contains the charter powers of a municipality
which follows the procedure for the adoption of a home rule charter. It
reads as follows:
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter
may exercise any power or perform any function which the legis-
lature has power to grant to a non-home rule charter municipal
corporation and which is not denied to that municipal corporation
by its home rule charter, is not denied to all home rule charter
municipal corporations by statute and is within such limitations
as may be established by statute. This grant of power does not
include the power to enact private or civil law governing civil re-
lationships except as an incident to an exercise of an independent
municipal power, nor does it include power to define and provide
for the punishment of a crime, but this limitation shall not abridge
the power of a home rule charter municipal corporation to define
and provide punishment for the violation of municipal ordinances
or charter provisions.
A home rule charter municipal corporation shall, in addi-
tion to its home rule powers and except as otherwise provided in
itg charter, have all the powers conferred by general law upon
municipal corporations of its population class.
Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 6 and 7 of
Article XVI of this constitution and notwithstanding any other
provisions contained herein, home rule charter provisions with
respect to municipal executive, legislative and administrative
structure, organization, personnel and procedure are of superior
authority to statute, subject to the requirement that the members
of a municipal legislative body be chosen by popular election, and
except as to judicial review of administrative proceedings, which
'°In about one half of the states having constitutional home rule, the constitution
merely authorizes the legislature to make the rule for framing charters. Procedures
for appointment of the charter commission vary. In Minnesota the commission is
appointed by the local district judge; in Oregon the city council acts as the charter
commission. Sometimes state approval is required in addition to that of the voters.
AmriAN, GoVznNING URBAiN AMfERmcA 153 (1955).
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shall be subject to the superior authority of statute. It is the in-
tention of this section to grant and confirm unto the people of
every municipal corporation in this state adopting a home rule
charter the right of self-government, and section Nine (9) and
Ten (10) hereof shall be liberally construed in favor thereof.
The first sentence of this section departs from the classic concept of
home rule, in that the charter becomes an instrument of limitation and not
of grant. Under constitutional provisions for full-fledged home rule,
municipalities frame their own charters as instruments of grant so far as
local affairs arc concerned. Such provisions leave for judicial determina-
tion the dividing line between "municipal affairs" and "state affairs,"
autonomy being conferred upon the municipal corporation only as to the
former.' The proposed amendment would avoid that problem, and the
municipal corporation would be authorized to exercise any power (1)
which the legislature has power to grant to a non-home rule charter muni-
cipal corporation, and (2) which is not denied to the municipal corpora-
tion by its home rule charter, and (3) which is not limited by general
statute.
However, the limitation of "power to grant" itself introduces uncer-
tainty as to the extent of municipal l)owers. There is involved the rather
vague constitutional doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers, and
a broad interpretation of the clause is necessary if cities are to have the
self-government which the proponents of home rule desire. The second
sentence gives some content to the clause, by stating that "power to enact
private or civil law governing civil relationships" is not included "except
as an incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power." The
significance of the language is indicated in the following comment to the
model draft:
Few would want a system under which the law of contracts
and of property varied from city to city. At the same time, the
exercise of municipal powers has a more or less direct bearing
upon private interests and relationships. This is true, for ex-
ample, of tax measures, regulatory measures and various utility
and service activities. It is the theory of the draft that a proper
balance can be achieved by enabling cities to enact private law
only as an incident to the exercise of some independent municipal
power.'
But the question of the extent of the constitutional limitation upon legis-
lative delegations of "municipal power" still remains.
The rule is frequently stated that there is no violation of the consti-
tutional doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers by vesting in
municipal corporations powers of legislation as to matters of local con-
cern,' but the door is open for courts to adopt a rather narrow construe-
"California, Colorado, Ohio, Oklahoma, and perhaps Arizona and Nebraska have
constitutions of this sort. In some states, notably Ohio, the constitution attempts
to define powers that are properly those of a municipality. ADRIAN, op. cit. supra
at 159.
"AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MU-
NICIPAL HOME RuLE 21 (1953).
"ll Am. Jur., Constitutional Lav, § 224 (1937) ; Annot., 79 L. Ed. 493, 494 (1934).
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tion of what this permits. Thus, in State ex rel. Keefe v. Schneige,," the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the legislature did not have author-
ity to confer upon a county board power to enact by ordinance a rule de-
claring drunken driving to be a misdemeanor, saying that such legislation
applicable to municipalities would be invalid as an attempt to confer so-
vereign powers. The court said:
By definition long antedating the constitution of this state, a
crime has been defined as an offense against the sovereign and a
criminal action "one prosecuted by the state against a persdn
charged with a public offense committed in violation of public
law." . . . A county is not a sovereign, and to permit it to create
a crime is to raise it to the dignity of a sovereign. . . . The so-
vereign alone can create a crime. A misdemeanor is a crime...,
and since [the statute] . . . delegates to counties power to create
a crime, it is void as an attempt to confer sovereignty upon the
counties. On the other hand, the legislature may confer upon the
boards of supervisors powers to create civil actions to recover
fines for the violation of county ordinances. This is "the power
of a local legislative and administrative character" referred to by
Art. IV, See. 22 [of the Wisconsin Constitution]. As an adjunct
to punishment by fine, "not as a part of the punishment strictly
speaking, but as a means of enforcing payment of the fine and
costs - that is, of making the element of punishment effective"
t.. he legislature may authorize the imprisonment of defendants
in such action in case of failure to pay fines imposed .... To auth-
orize imprisonment in a civil action created by a county for viola-
tion of an ordinance as a punishment and not as a mere device to
enforce collection of a fine cannot be sustained.
This holding of the Wisconsin court does not represent the prevailing
view,' and it is not the view that has been taken by the Supreme Court of
Montana. In State ex rel. Marquette v. Police Court," the court held
that proceedings looking to the imposition of a fine for violation of a city
ordinance, requiring a license before engaging in the profession of a physi-
cian and surgeon, was criminal in nature, saying:
The legislature has expressly authorized the cities and towns
to enact ordinances such as the one here involved and "to impose
penalties for failure to comply with such license requirements."
.. The state has thus made the city its agent to define and pun-
ish by ordinance offenses against the municipality. This is not
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
In fact, it appears from the cases previously discussed herein, in
which the Montana Supreme Court has considered the validity of ordi-
nances against objections other than the power of the legislature to dele-
gate power to enact them, that the court has adopted a liberal view of the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers so far as municipal cor-
porations are concerned. And in Butte v. Montana Independent Tele-
phone Company, the court said:
"251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W.2d 345, 174 A.L.R. 1338 (1947).
'See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1343 (1948).
"86 Mont. 297, 283 Pac. 430 (1929).
"50 Mont. 574, 148 Pae. 384 (1915).
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It is the general rule that unless specifically restricted by the
Constitution, the legislature may delegate to municipal corpora-
tions the authority to exercise the police power through the in-
strumentality of reasonable rules and regulations. (In re O'Brien,
29 Mont. 530, 1 Ann. Cas. 373, 75 Pac. 196; Johnson v. City of
Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 16 Ann. Cas. 674, 99 Pac. 1059).
Support for a liberal view of the power of legislatures to delegate
powers to municipal corporations is found in a recent decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States interpreting the delegable powers of
Congress. In District of Columbia v. Thompson,' the question concerned
the power of Congress to delegate to the District of Columbia the authority
to enact legislation making it a crime for owners or managers of restaur-
ants to discriminate on account of race or color. A majority of the judges
of the Court of Appeals had held that Congress had the constitutional
authority to delegate "municipal" but not "general" legislative powers,
and that the act of Congress involved, being in the nature of civil rights
legislation, fell in the latter class. But the Supreme Court of the United
States took a different view, and in doing so drew on the analogy of muni-
cipal home rule. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court,
quoted from Barnes v. District of Columbia," as follows:
A municipal corporation, in the exercise of all its duties, in-
cluding those most strictly local or internal, is but a department
of the state. The legislature may give it all the powers such a
being is capable of receiving, making it a miniature state within
its locality.
Mr..Justice Douglas then went on to say:
This is the theory which underlies the constitutional pro-
visions of some states allowing cities to have home rule. So it is
that decision after decision has held that the delegated power of
municipalities is as broad as the police power of the state, except
as that power may be restricted by terms of the grant or by the
state constitution.... It would seem then that on the analogy of the
delegation of powers of self-government and home rule both to
municipalities and to territories there is no constitutional barrier
to the delegation by Congress to the District of Columbia of full
legislative power, subject of course to constitutional limitations
to which all lawmaking is subservient and subject also to the
power of Congress at anytime to revise, alter, or revoke the au-
thority granted.
It is to be expected that the attitude of the Supreme Court of the
United States will affect state decisions, and there is good reason to think
that the Supreme Court of Montana would give the clause "power to
grant" in section 10 of the proposed home rule amendment a broad inter-
pretation, permitting expansion of municipal powers beyond those that
have been considered "proprietary." The cases construing legislative
delegations and the cases involving the validity of ordinances have not
questioned the power of the legislature to delegate "governmental" pow-
ers. It would seem unlikely that the court would reverse its approach under
-346 U.S. 100 (1953).
"91 U.S. 540 (1875).
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the new terminology "power to grant." In fact, it would seem that the
tendency might be toward a more liberal approach to the constitutional
question, since the proposed amendment does not place the substantive
powers and functions of the municipal corporation beyond legislative con-
trol by general law. In truth, to the extent that the Montana Supreme
Court has found an inherent right of local self-government, the proposed
amendment might limit the independence of home rule charter municipal
corporations, in that it permits legislative interference with respect to any
municipal function, governmental or proprietary.'
The dependence upon the judiciary for the accomplishment of the
purpose of the proposed amendment "to grant and confirm unto the people
of every municipal corporation in this state adopting a home rule charter
the right of self-government," is evident in another connection. There
might well be a psychological deterrent to affirmative legislative action
violating the spirit of the proposed amendment. But legislative limitation
might result from judicial interpretation of general legislation upon a given
subject matter. A court unfavorable to municipal home rule conceivably
could find legislative limitation from the mere fact that the legislature
had legislated upon the subject matter, regardless of whether the municipal
action conflicted in the sense of prohibiting an act which the statute per-
mitted or permitting an act which the statute prohibited."' But it would
seem that a court would be less likely to construe general legislation as a
limitation upon municipal power granted by the constitution than it would
to construe adversely to the municipal corporation general delegations of
power so far as they relate to subject matter covered by specific legislation.
The proposed amendment, however, does contain a qualification upon
legislative control. With respect to governmental structure, organization,
personnel, and procedure except in the judicial domain, the third para-
graph of the proposed section 10 grants full autonomy to the municipal
corporation. This has the effect of repealing, so far as home rule charter
municipalities are concerned, the provisions of article XVI, sections 6 and
7, of the Constitution of Montana, that the legislature may prescribe the
terms, qualifications, duties and methods of appointing or electing muni-
cipal officers, and the kind or form of municipal government. In addition,
the terms of officers of home rule charter cities would cease to be limited
to two years, as prescribed by article XVI, section 6. These are matters
with respect to which local autonomy is thought to be essential to efficient
municipal government.
The proposed amendment departs from the model draft in its provi-
sion with respect to power to define and provide punishments for viola-
tions of municipal ordinances, and there may be some question as to the
consequence of the departure. The model draft provides that the devolution
of power does not "include the power to define and provide punishment for
a felony." (Emphasis supplied.) The proposed amendment to the Montana
Constitution substitutes the provision that the grant of power does not
'Possibly the existing inherent right of local self-government might be regarded as
conferred by "general law" so as to be within the second paragraph of the proposed
section 10. This would seem doubtful, however, since the reference is to power "in
addition to its home rule powers." It is more likely that it would be held that
the express provision for home rule supplants any implied guarantee.
lc'Cf, pp. 92-93 supra.
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"include power to define and provide for the punishment of a crime, but
this limitation shall not abridge the power of a home rule charter munici-
pal corporation to define and provide punishment for the violation of mu-
nicipal ordinances or charter provisions." (Emphasis supplied.) The pur-
pose of the model draft is explained in the following comment:
A city should have the power to define and provide for the
punishment of offenses within its governmental purview. It has
been considered desirable to make it clear that this power stops
short of serious offenses which fall in the felony category.'
Perhaps the change in language from the model draft might be inter-
preted as extending into the criminal field the general provisions preced-
ing it, which are designed to make it clear that the grant does not give to
municipal corporations power to enact a general code of laws governing
civil relationships but only power to enact private law as an incident to an
independent municipal power. But it would not seem that the language
is well chosen for such a purpose. Taken literally the language prohibits
the grant from being construed as a grant of power to define and provide
the punishment for any crime, not only those that are not an incident to
an independent municipal power. The consequence might be that, except
where the power is separately conferred by general statute, actions for
violations of municipal ordinances would have to be treated as civil in
nature. This would create two classes of action to recover fines for viola-
tions of municipal ordinances, (1) criminal, if the legislature separately
conferred power to define the crime and provide for its punishment, and
(2) civil if the power to define and provide punishment for the violation
of the municipal ordinance is found only in the constitutional grant. As
to the latter, Montana would be in the Wisconsin situation described in
State ex rel. Keefe v. Schniege, 'l' supra.
Conclusion
It would be a mistake to think that the adoption of the proposed con-
stitutional amendment would guarantee greater powers to home rule char-
ter cities or give them greater independence from the state legislature."'
Certainly, except as to governmental structure, organization, personnel,
...AMSEICAN MUNICIPAL AsSOCIATiON, op. cit. 8upra, note 92, at 21.
"'The proposed amendment omits a provision of the model draft, that "State legisla-
tion increasing municipal expenditures may not become effective in a municipal
corporation until approved by ordinance or unless enacted by two-thirds vote of all
members elected to each house of the legislature or funds sufficient to meet the
increased municipal expenditure are granted .... " Perhaps it was thought that
the omission of this provision was politically expedient; perhaps it was thought
that it was unnecessary in view of the provisions of article VI, section 36, and
article XII, section 4, of the Montana Constitution. But the model draft provi-
sion would seem to add to the protection afforded municipal corporations against
the imposition of financial burdens by the legislature, even if the existing doctrine
of an inherent right to local self-government were considered to continue by im-
plication in spite of the express provision for home rule, in view of the position
of the Montana Supreme Court that a law requiring a municipality to take action
necessitating the expenditure of money is not within the condemnation of article
XII, section 44 against levying taxes. See State v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 47 P.2d
624 (1935).
''Studies indicate that constitutional home rule provisions in general have not had
this effect. ADRIAN, OP. Cit. 8upra, note 90, at 158.
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and non-judicial procedure, local autonomy is not guaranteed. With an
unsympathetic legislature and judiciary, the proposed amendment would
be of little significance. But with a court which has evidenced more than
ordinary sympathy toward local self-government in its enunciation of the
doctrine of an inherent right of local self-government, and with the im-
plied moral obligation upon the legislature to carry out the spirit of the
amendment which would follow its enactment, it is believed that greater
independence of municipal corporations in the conduct of their affairs
would result from the amendment. The architect of the model draft recog-
nized that favorable political and judicial climate would be necessary to
effect its spirit. He deliberately placed the substantive powers and func-
tions under legislative control. In the language of a comment to the model
draft:
The draft rejects the assumption that governmental powers
and functions are inherently of either general or local concern.
Times change and what may at one time be considered a clearly
local problem may be as readily labeled a state concern at a later
juncture. It is the theory of the draft that there should be stress
upon flexibility and adaptability in our governmental ar-
rangements and that, to that end, there should be a policy-making
power in a state, short of the general electorate, competent to
make the decisions as to adaptation and devolution of govern-
mental powers and functions to serve the changing needs of so-
ciety.'
Movements for home rule were begun as early as the 1870's by busi-
nessmen who were cautious in their expenditure of public funds to reclaim
the city from the boss and the political machine.' But as the movement
has continued,' three principal reasons for desiring home rule have been
advanced. First, corrupt practices have flourished at certain times and
places under a system placing large local sources of revenue under the
control of legislators not responsible locally; second, state legislatures are
not sufficiently familiar with local governmental needs to provide adequate
municipal government; and third, local governmental matters monopolize
too much time of legislatures."' Although it is in large cities that home rule
charters may be the most important,' size alone would not seem to control
the validity of these reasons; and proponents of the home rule constitu-
tional amendment in Montana have contended that the second and third
reasons are applicable in this state."0 Thus, the Director of the Montana
Municipal League, in the League's News Letter for August, 1957, states:
"1AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, Op. Cit. supra, note 92, at 20.
"'ADRIAN, Op. Cit. 8upra, note 90, at 56.
""The movement, which appeared to have spent itself with the decline of the reform
spirit after World War I, enjoyed a revival after World War II. In 1954, home
rule was provided in the constitutions of 21 states, Rhode Island adopting such a
constitutional amendment in 1951 and Tennessee in 1953; and in 8 other states
home rule was provided by legislative act without constitutional authorization or
safeguard. Id. at 154-7.
"'CU!. Hynds, Home Rule in Georgia, 8 Muaa L. REv. 337 (1957).
"'Of the cities of the United States with populations of over 200,000, some two-thirds
have home rule. ADRIAN, op. cit. supra, note 90, at 156.
'
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In many states, including Montana, legislatures are obliged
to devote considerable time to purely local matters while neglect-
ing essential state wide measures. The municipal machine just
cannot operate efficiently with antiquated or makeshift parts
manufactured by over-worked legislatures often unacquainted
with local conditions and subject to all sorts of pressures from
special interest groups.
This reflects the fact that the principal support for the home rule
movement comes from the businessman who is interested in better govern-
ment, and who is distrustful of the ability of political parties or politicians
to afford better government and believes that the principles of efficient
business management can and should be aplied to city government. This is
typical of movements for home rule in other states. In fact, working men
and labor leaders have closely associated in their minds home rule move-
ments with business communities and their interests, and they are fre-
quently fearful that home rule will become a tool of large taxpayers to
attack municipal taxes and minimize city services.m But it would seem
that there would be more substance to such objections under a self-execut-
ing type of home rule constitutional provision which puts matters con-
sidered local in character beyond legislative control than there is under
the type proposed in Montana which retains legislative control. Govern-
ment, even on a local level, cannot be divorced from politics, and there
should be power in the state to shape policies for a coordinated state and
local system of government. The proposed amendment appears to provide
an opportunity for more efficient local government while at the same time
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